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AM I MY BROTHER'S KEEPER? SOCIAL
HOST LIABILITY UNDER DRAMSHOP
ACTS AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
Drunk driving is a problem of national concern.1 In recent years,
1. Note, Torts-Negligence-Social Host Held Liable for Serving Liquor to Intoxi-
cated Guest Who Causes Auto Accident Injuring Third Party, 15 SETON HALL L. REV.
616 (1985) (discusses the national concern regarding drunk driving). See also U.S.
PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON DRUNK DRIVING-FINAL REPORT 1 (1983) (cost of
drunk driving to society is between $21 and $24 billion a year) [hereinafter FINAL RE-
PORT]; SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 5TH SPECIAL REPORT TO
U.S. CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH 25 (1983) (discusses legislative and execu-
tive concerns regarding drunk driving); NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD,
DEFICIENCIES IN ENFORCEMENT, JUDICIAL AND TREATMENT PROGRAMS RELATED
TO REPEAT OFFENDER DRUNK DRIVERS 2 (1984) (examines the problems with treat-
ment programs designed to help repeat drunk drivers) [hereinafter NATIONAL TRANS-
PORTATION SAFETY BOARD]. For a discussion of the health risks associated with
alcohol consumption, see Smoking Prevention Education Act: Hearings on H.R. 1824
Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1983). For an example of incentive programs
that encourage states to increase the drinking age as a legislative solution to the drunk
driving problem, see Highway Safety Act of 1982, Title 11 (1983) (expands Department
of Transportation icentive programs to include grants encouraging states to raise legal
drinking age to 21); see also Surface Transportation Issues, 1984: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Trans-
portation, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 598 (1984) (support for Uniform Drinking Age Act of
1984 to reduce, by 25% a year, federal highway funds to states failing to establish 21 as
the minimum drinking age). For a discussion of increasing public awareness of the
drunk driving problem and various solutions, see Department of Transportation and
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1986, 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Ap-
propriations of the House Comm., 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 98 (1983) (discusses highway
programs, including state and community highway safety grants, contract programs,
alcohol safety programs, and state incentive grants). FINAL REPORT, supra, at 1 (Presi-
dential Commission recommendations for curbing drunk driving); 23 U.S.C. § 408
(1982) (passed in 1982 to inspire states to increase their efforts to eliminate drunk driv-
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almost two-thirds2 of all fatal car accidents involved drunk drivers.3
Judicial, legislative, and public response to the problem varies.4 One
legislative response is the enactment of dramshop acts. Dramshop acts
hold vendors liable for serving alcoholic beverages to intoxicated cus-
tomers who subsequently injure a third party. A more recent judicial
and legislative response is the development of social host liability.5
This cause of action imposes criminal and civil liability on a social host
for serving alcohol to an intoxicated guest at a social gathering if the
ing; government appropriated $25 million for 1983, $50 million for 1984, and $50 mil-
lion for 1985 to fund programs aimed at curbing drunk driving).
2. U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON DRUNK DRIVING-INTERIM REPORT 1 (1983)
[hereinafter INTERIM REPORT]. Drunk driving played a role in 65% of the 42,000 fatal
car accidents in 1983. Between one in 500 and one in 2,000 drivers on the road who are
legally intoxicated are arrested for drunk driving. Id.
3. NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, supra note 1, at 2. Heavy prob-
lem drinkers who regularly abuse alcohol cause a majority of alcohol related deaths.
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2.
4. See supra note I (various congressional solutions to the drunk driving concern).
A number of interest groups have formed to help reduce drink driving, such as Mothers
Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and Students Againt Drunk Driving (SADD). Spe-
cial Project, Social Host Liability for the Negligent Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 70 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1058, 1059 (1985). For a discussion of MADD's role in litigation, see
Comment, MADD at the Court, 22, 23 JUDGES J. 36 (1984). For an examination of the
constitutionality of drunk driver roadblocks, see Comment, The Constitutionality of
Drunk Driver Roadblocks in Oklahoma, 20 TULSA L. REv. 286 (1984).
For additional judicial and state legislative response to drunk driving, see Comment,
Punitive Damages in California: The Drunk Driver, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 793 (185) (§ 3294
of California's Civil Code imposes punitive damages on drunk drivers); Special Section,
Alcohol Abuse: The New Legal Challenge, 46 MONT. L. REV. 307 (1984); Legislation
Note, S. 432: Ohio Enacts Stringent Penalties to Deter Drunk Driving, 9 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 147 (1983).
5. Social host liability arises when a social host furnishes alcoholic beverages to an
obviously intoxicated person under circumstances creating a reasonably foreseeable risk
of harm to others. The social host may be held legally accountable to those third per-
sons who are injured when that harm occurs. Coulter v. Superior Court of San Mateo
County, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 150, 577 P.2d 669, 672, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 537 (Cal. 1978).
See infra notes 133-45 and accompanying text. For a background discussion of social
host liability, see Gutman, Drinking, Driving and the Social Host, CASE & COMMENT 3
(Nov.-Dec. 1985). Courts primarily use common law negligence principles to deter-
mine social host liability. See infra notes 116-64 and accompanying text.
State legislatures developed dramshop acts that prohibit the selling or furnishing of
alcohol to intoxicated persons. A typical dramshop act reads: "No person shall sell,
dispense, or give to any intoxicated person, or one simulating intoxication, any alcoholic
liquor or beer." IOWA CODE § 123.49(1) (1983). See infra notes 23-67 and accompany-
ing text (discusses vendor and social host liability under dramshop acts).
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guest subsequently injures a third party.6 Social host liability devel-
oped as an extension of both state dramshop statutes and common law
negligence principles.7
This Note examines a commercial vendor's and a social host's statu-
tory and common law liability for serving alcohol to intoxicated per-
sons. Part II of this Note discusses the history of vendor and social
host liability under dramshop acts and common law negligence princi-
ples.8 Section A of Part II focuses on commercial vendor and social
host liability under dramshop statutes9 and analyzes the problems of
social host liability under dramshop acts."° Section B examines com-
mercial vendor and social host liability under common law negligence
principles." The problems associated with extending common law
negligence principles to create social host liability are evaluated in the
conclusion of this section.12 Part III analyzes the impact of social host
liability both on society and the particular individuals involved.' 3 The
Note's conclusion proposes alternative solutions14 that effectively ad-
dress and remedy liability problems arising from drunk driving
accidents.' 5
II. HISTORY
Traditionally, the common law held that any person who sold or
served alcoholic beverages to someone who subsequently injured a
6. Note, Civil Damages Act-Preemption of Social Hosts' Common Law Liability, 5
HAMLINE L. REv. 489 (1982).
7. The statutory cause of action against social hosts falls under state dramshop acts.
For a discussion of social host liability under dramshop acts, see Comment, Liability of
Social Host for Off Premises Negligence of Inebriated Guest, 68 ILL. B.J. 396 (1980).
The common law cause of action against a social host arises under ordinary negligence
principles. Note, Denial of Social Host Liability for Furnishing Alcohol to a Visibly In-
toxicated Guest in Klein v. Raysinger: A Failure in Judicial Reasoning, 23 DUQ. L. REV.
1121 (1983) (critical discussion of court's refusal to impose social host liability). See
infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text (discusses social host liability under common
law negligence principles).
8. See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 23-77 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 78-177 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 165-77 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 178-91 and accompanying text.
14. See supra note I (legislative solutions to the drunk driving problem).
15. See infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
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third party was immune from liability. 16 The rationale behind this the-
ory was that the consumption of alcohol, not the selling or serving of
alcohol, was the proximate cause 17 of the injury.18 Courts believed
that the alcohol drinker was responsible for alcohol related accidents. 9
Yet, during the past twenty-five years, in response to the drunk driving
problem, legislatures have enacted dramshop acts that prohibit the sale
of alcohol to intoxicated persons.2' As a result, a growing number of
courts have rejected the common law vendor immunity theory.2 I
Thus, under dramshop acts and through extensions of common law
negligence principles, commercial alcohol vendors may be held liable
for injuries to a third party that occur subsequent to the vendor's sale
of alcohol to an intoxicated person.2 2
16. See, e.g., King v. Henkie, 80 Ala. 50 (1876) (retailer of spirituous liquors not
liable for serving intoxicated patron); State ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 19 Md. 249, 78
A.2d 754 (1951) (tavern owner not liable for selling liquor to minor who nelgiently
operated his car ane injured plaintiff). For a general discussion of vendor liability under
traditional common law, see Note, Third Party Liability for Drunken Driving: When
"One for the Road" Becomes One for the Courts, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1119 (1984).
17. Proximate cause establishes legal responsibility for an injury. W. KEETON,
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 273 (5th ed. 1984). The test for proximate cause is
whether the defendant's act was a substantial factor in producing the injury. Id. at 278.
18. Note, supra note 16, at 1143. For a discussion of the traditional theory of proxi-
mate cause, see Note, Kelly v. Gwinnel: Imposing Third Party Liability on Social Hosts,
5 PACE L. REV. 809, 811 (1985) (discusses shift in proximate cause theories); see also
Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 194-200, 156 A.2d 1, 4-5 (1959) (examines the prox-
imate cause of drunk driving injuries). The rationale behind the traditional theory was
that intoxication is not an excuse for crime or tortious behavior. State ex reL Joyce v.
Hatfield, 19 Md. at 251, 78 A.2d at 756 (tavern owner not liable for serving intoxicated
patron who later injured plaintiff in a car accident).
19. Comment, Social Hosts and Drunk Drivers: A Duty to Intervene?, U. PA. L.
REV. 867 (1985) (discusses the common law development and the goals of the tort
system regarding drunk driving).
20. See supra note 5 (typical dramshop statute).
21. Special Project, supra note 4, at 1086.
22. Id. For a discussion of the standard of conduct required of a vendor, see Com-
ment, supra note 19, at 877 (liability under common law negligence principles based on
a reasonable person's ability to foresee a guest's drunk driving); Special Project, supra
note 4, at 1086 (courts hold that the reasonable person who sells or serves liquor to a
person does not foresee that his or her guest will drive while under the influence of
alcohol).
For several examples of courts imposing liability on vendors, see Nazareno v. Urie,
638 P.2d 671 (Alaska 1981) (bar owners liable for third party's injuries from intoxicated
patron's collision with the third party on the dance floor); Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz.
500, 638 P.2d 671 (1983) (en banc) (tavern owner liable for injuries when he served
intoxicated patron who was later involved in a car accident); Taylor v. Ruiz, 394 A.2d
765 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978) (liability can be imposed on a tavern owner who serves alco-
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A. Dramshop Acts
1. Commercial Vendor and Tavern Owner Liability Under
Dramshop Acts
Because commercial vendors and tavern owners traditionally were
immune from liability under the common law,23 an injured party had
no remedy against a negligent licensee.24 To rectify this problem,
courts developed an exception to the common law rule, recognizing the
special relationship that liquor licensees have with their customers.
This special relationship creates a duty of care 5 that is owed to the
customers.2 6 This duty arises from an implied service contract be-
tween licensee and customer, which allows the licensee to receive eco-
nomic benefit from the sale of alcohol.2 7 Despite this exception, only a
few courts recognized a duty of care that flowed from the licensee-
customer relationship and runs to third persons injured by intoxicated
customers.2z Consequently, state legislatures enacted dramshop acts.29
The purpose of dramshop acts is to protect the general public from
the injurious consequences of contact with an intoxicated person.30
Dramshop acts provide a cause of action for third parties injured by
hol to an intoxicated patron, who then injures a third party, if the tavern owner had
reason to know or knew that the patron was intoxicated); Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d
570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (tavern owner liable for serving alcohol to an intoxicated pa-
tron who later killed plaintiff's decedent in an automobile accident).
23. Note, supra note 18, at 811 (discusses the development of liability for negligent
tavern owners and vendors). See also supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text (dis-
cusses vendor immunity).
24. Note, supra note 18, at 812. For the purposes of this Note, a licensee includes
both a commercial vendor and tavern owner.
25. A duty is defined as an obligation to conform to a particular standard toward
another. W. KEETON, supra note 17, at 356. Duty is a question of whether the defend-
ant is under any obligation for a particular plaintiff's benefit. Id. In negligence cases,
the duty is to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct examined in light of
the situation's apparent risk. Id.
26. Note, supra note 18, at 812.
27. Note, supra note 18, at 812-13 (thorough discussion of the reasoning behind
imposing a duty on vendors).
28. Most jurisdictions adhered to the traditional vendor immunity theory. Id. at
813.
29. Id. Dramshop acts are also referred to as civil damages acts. Id. See supra note
5 (typical dramshop act).
30. Note, The Safe Roads Act: The Dram Shop Provisions, 62 N.C.L. REV. 1415,
1417 (1984) (objective discussion of dramshop acts).
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intoxicated patrons against liquor licensees.31 To further their goal of
protection, dramshop acts do not require a showing of negligence. The
statutes base recovery instead on strict liability.32 To establish a prima
facie case,33 the plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) the defendant
transferred an intoxicating liquor to the patron,34 (2) the patron con-
sumed the liquor and became intoxicated,35 (3) the intoxicated patron
injured the plaintiff,36 and (4) the patron's intoxication caused the
plaintiff's injury.37 Proving these elements entitles the plaintiff to re-
cover for such injuries from a vendor or tavern owner who served alco-
hol to the intoxicated patron.3 8
2. Extending Liability to Social Hosts Under Dramshop Acts
A majority of courts and legislatures are reluctant to extend liability
to social hosts under dramshop acts.39 Even if a dramshop act is ar-
guably broad enough to include social hosts,4° courts usually limit the
31. Note, supra note 18, at 813.
32. Comment, Social Host Liability: No More "One For the Road, " 61 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 165, 166 (1985). Strict liability means liability imposed on an actor apart from
either an intent to interfere with a legally protected interest or a breach of duty to
exercise reasonable care. W. KEETON, supra note 17, at 534. This concept is often
referred to as liability without fault. Id.
33. A prima facie case is one that proceeds upon sufficient proof to that stage at
which it will support a finding if evidence to the contrary is disregarded. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1071 (5th ed. 1979).
34. Note, Dram Shop Litigation, 12 AM. JUR. 2D Trials 729, 738 (1966). The spe-
cific elements required under a typical dramshop act are:
(1) an intoxicating liquor is involved,
(2) defendant must transfer the liquor,
(3) transferee must consume the liquor,
(4) transferee must become intoxicated or the drink must contribute to his existing
state of intoxication,
(5) the intoxicated transferee must cause actual injury to the plaintiff,
(6) the intoxication must have a causal connection to the plaintiff's injury, and
(7) the plaintiff must be entitled to sue under the dramshop act.
Id. See Gabrielle v. Craft, 75 A.D.2d 939, 428 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1980) (lack of sale is fatal
to action under dramshop act).
35. Note, supra note 34, at 738.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Special Project, supra note 4, at 1064-88 (judicial reluctance to apply dramshop
acts to social hosts). See Stein v. Beta Rho Alumni Ass'n, Inc., 49 Or. 965, 621 P.2d
632 (1980) (court refused to extend liability to social host under dramshop act).
40. Some state dramshop acts are broad enough to include social hosts. See, e.g.,
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statute's application to vendors,4 1 claiming that legislatures did not in-
tend to include social hosts in dramshop acts.4 2
Kohler v. Wray43 typifies the traditional reluctance to extend dram-
shop act coverage to include social hosts. The Supreme Court of New
York found that the New York dramshop act does not apply to a social
host.' In Kohler the defendant held a party and served several kegs of
beer.4 One guest became intoxicated, a fight ensued, and the intoxi-
cated guest exchanged punches with the plaintiff.4 6 The majority held
that a social host is not liable for injuries that result from serving alco-
hol to an intoxicated guest.47 The court found that neither the dram-
shop act nor the common law48 recognizes a cause of action against a
social host based merely on the serving of alcohol to an individual who
later injures a third party.49 Rather, the court stated that such a cause
ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1964) (right of
action against any person who sells or gives alcoholic beverages); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1984-85) (right of action against any person
who unlawfully sells or assists in procuring liquor); OHiO REv. CODE ANN. § 4399.01
(1978) (broad dramshop act). But see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-102 (1985) (limits
cause of action to sellers of intoxicating liquor); Wyo. STAT. § 12-5-502 (1984) (limits
cause of action to licensees and permittees).
41. Special Project, supra note 4, at 1115-18 (legislative intent for dramshop acts).
See DeLoach v. Mayer Elec. Supply Co., 378 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1973) (no liability under
dramshop act absent sale of liquor); cf Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985)
(social host liable under dramshop act). For a discussion of Clark, see infra notes 52-61
and accompanying text.
42. See Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d 593 (Minn. 1982) (legislature did not intend
to include social hosts under dramshop acts); Gabrielle v. Craft, 75 A.2d 939, 428
N.Y.S.2d 84 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (sale of alcohol by defendant is required to main-
tain a cause of action under dramshop act). For a discussion of social host liability
under dramshop acts, see Special Project, supra note 4, at 1115-20.
43. 114 Misc. 2d 856, 452 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982). In Kohler the plain-
tiff arrived at defendant's party and was encouraged to help himself to beer. Id. at 856-
57, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 832. The plaintiff approached a married woman and asked her to
dance. Id. at 857, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 833. A fight between plaintiff and the woman's
husband then occurred. Id.
44. Id. at 856, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 857, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
47. Id. The court found that the plaintiff offered nothing to rebut defendant's proof
that the host had no notice or opportunity to prevent the assault. Id. at 861, 452
N.Y.S.2d at 835.
48. See infra notes 116-64 and accompanying text (social host liability under com-
mon law negligence principles).
49. Kohler, 114 Misc. 2d at 857, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
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of action applies only to licensees who sell alcohol to the intoxicated
individual.5 °
Until recently, no jurisdiction allowed recovery against a social host
under a dramshop act.51 Iowa and Indiana departed from this view
and now hold social hosts liable under dramshop acts for serving intox-
icated guests.52 In Clark v. Mincks53 defendants hosted a cookout and
served beer. 4 One guest became intoxicated and subsequently at-
tempted to drive.5 The guest had an accident that killed her passen-
ger.56 The Supreme Court of Iowa found that an injured party may
have a cause of action against a social host under Iowa's dramshop
act. 7 Under the act, the plaintiff must prove that the host knowingly
made alcohol available to an intoxicated guest, the guest drank the al-
cohol, and the guest then drove a vehicle causing injury to a third
party.58 Placing great emphasis on the strong public policy against
drunk driving,59 the court held that a cause of action against the host
for serving alcohol to the intoxicated guest extended to the guest's pas-
senger.' The court stated that any positive change in social behavior
that results from the expansion of dramshop liability is beneficial.6 1
Similarly, in Ashlock v. Norris62 the Indiana Court of Appeals ex-
tended liability under its state dramshop act to include social hosts.6 3
In Ashlock the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against a de-
50. Id.
51. Commnet, supra note 32, at 165-79 (supportive discussion of social host
liability).
52. See Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985); Ashlock v. Norris, 475
N.E.2d 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). For a discussion of Ashlock, see infra notes 62-67
and accompanying text.
53. 364 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985).
54. Id. at 227.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 229.
58. Id. The Iowa Dramshop Act reads: "No person shall sell, dispense or give to
any intoxicated person or on simulating intoxication, any alcohol, liquor or beer."
IOWA CODE § 123.46(3) (1983).
59. 364 N.W.2d 230.
60. Id.
61. Id. For a general discussion of the effects of Clark, see Gutman, Drinking, Driv-
ing, and the Social Host, CASE & COMMENT, 3-8 (Nov.-Dec. 1985).
62, 475 N.E.2d 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
63. The Indiapa Dramshop Act reads: "It is unlawful for a person to sell, barter,
deliver or give away any alcoholic beverage to another person who is in the state of
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fendant who had purchased several drinks for a friend at a bar.64 The
friend left the bar and drove about a mile before striking and killing a
jogger. 65 The majority reversed the circuit court's summary judgment
in favor of the plaintiff and held that a cause of action existed against
the defendant under Indiana's Dramshop Act only if the defendant
knew the friend was intoxicated and would soon be driving.66 The
court reasoned that legislative intent and sound public policy against
drunk driving allowed it to extend the dramshop act to reach this form
of conduct.6 7
3. Analysis of the Scope of Dramshop Act Liability
The Iowa and Indiana courts remain a minority in their abandon-
ment of absolute immunity for social hosts under dramshop acts.68
Most courts find numerous policy reasons for refusing to extend dram-
shop acts to social hosts. 69 One justification is express legislative intent
to confine dramshop liability to vendors.7" Because legislatures pre-
sume that vendors and bartenders have the expertise to determine
whether a patron is intoxicated,7" dramshop acts do not require actual
intoxication if the person knows that the other person is intoxicated." IND. CODE § 7.1-
5-7-8 (1978).
64. 475 N.E.2d at 1168. In Ashlock, Morrow went to a restaurant and lounge and
consumed two mixed drinks and three shots of straight alcohol that the defendant
purchased for her. Id. After observing her intoxication, defendant unsuccessfully tried
to dissuade Morrow from driving.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1170.
67. Id. at 1169. The court stated that considering the carnage on the public high-
ways involving intoxicated drivers, the legislative intent and sound public policy is
clearly to hold a social host liable. Id.
68. Not a single jurisdiction before Clark and Ashlock held a social host liable under
dramshop acts. Comment, supra note 32, at 165-79.
69. For a discussion of policy reasons for refusing to extend dramshop acts to in-
clude social hosts, see Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 103, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548, 552
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976).
70. Special Project, supra note 4, at 1103. For a discussion of the legislative intent
issue, see Note, supra note 16, at 1184 (stresses the importance of deference to the legis-
lature); Comment, Social Host Liability Under the Common Law: Kelly v. Gwinnel,
1985 DET. C.L. REV. 97, 108 (1985).
71. Note, supra note 18, at 836-41 (discusses the differences between vendors and
social hosts). See also supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (courts holding social
hosts liable under dramshop acts do not inquire into the defendant's knowledge that the
guest was intoxicated).
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knowledge72 of the guest's or patron's intoxication. Social hosts, on
the other hand, have no such expertise. For the average citizen, deter-
mining whether a person is intoxicated is extremely difficult.73 This
reasoning suggests that state legislatures do not intend to impose this
burden on inexperienced social hosts.
An additional reason for limiting the scope of dramshop act liability
to vendors is that they can spread the cost of insurance or liability
among their customers.74 Social hosts do not have this opportunity. If
social hosts cannot afford additional liability insurance, or if such in-
surance is not available, liability judgments will deplete and perhaps
exhaust their personal savings. This is implausible legislative intent.
Reacting to judicial uncertainty regarding legislative intent behind
dramshop acts, some states enacted statutes expressly excluding social
host liability.75 Other states enacted broad dramshop acts that leave
the question of social host liability open to judicial interpretation.76
Even if legislatures intend to cover social hosts in dramshop acts, in-
cluding them does not further the acts' purpose: eliminate injuries at
the hands of intoxicated individuals." Social host liability merely
places blame on an innocent party and virtually eliminates the liability
of the responsible party, the drunk driver. This arbitrary blame-plac-
ing will not deter drunk driving, but will cause it to increase. Guests
72. Knowledge is the belief in the existence of a fact, which coincides with the truth.
W. KEETON, supra note 17, at 182. "It rests upon perception of the actor's surround-
ings, memory of what has gone before, and a power to correlate the two with previous
experience." Id. Unless an actor's attention is legitimately distracted, the actor must
give his surroundings the attention that a standard reasonable person would consider
necessary under the circumstances, and he must use his sense to discover what is readily
apparent. Id.
73. Id. See Kelly v. Gwinnel, 190 N.J. Super. 320, 463 A.2d 387 (App. Div. 1983)
(dissent in Kelly believes the problem with social host liability is that it places too great
a burden on an inexperienced host to recognize an intoxicated guest); rev'd, 96 N.J. 538,
476 A.2d 1219 (1984). For a discussion of Kelly, see infra notes 146-64 and accompany-
ing text,
74. Special Project, supra note 4, at 1103.
75. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 04.21.020 (1980); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602
(West Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.955 (1983); but see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.125 (West. Supp. 1984) (statute potentially applicable to social host). For a dis-
cussion of the legislative reaction to social host liability, see Note, supra note 16, at
1136.
76. See supra notes 40, 75 and accompanying texts (list of broad and narrow dram-
shop acts).
77. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (purpose of dramshop act is to protect
the public from injuries resulting from drunk driving).
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that drive are less likely to drink responsibly knowing they can share
part, if not shift all, of the liability to their host if a third party is
injured.
B. Common Law Negligence
1. Commercial Vendor Liability Under Common Law Negligence
Principles
Courts initially were reluctant to impose liability on vendors if the
state had no dramshop statute.7 8 In Holmes v. Circo7 9 a tavern owner
served an intoxicated patron who subsequently injured the plaintiff
while negligently operating his car." The Supreme Court of Nebraska
held that absent specific legislation, a tavern owner cannot be held lia-
ble for a third party's injuries caused by an intoxicated patron to whom
the tavern owner had served alcohol.8 1 The court stated that due to
public policy considerations associated with the imposition of liability
on vendors, only the legislature should make such a decision.
82
Courts occasionally imposed liability on vendors in the absence of a
dramshop act if the vendor's conduct was more culpable than mere
negligence.83 In Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl84 plaintiff brought a wrong-
ful death action against a vendor for willful misconduct.8 The vendor
78. See, e.g., Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969)
(tavern owner who sold liquor to an intoxicated person was not liable under common
law negligence in the absence of a statute).
79. 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976).
80. Id. at 497, 244 N.W.2d at 66.
81. Id. at 505, 244 N.W.2d at 70.
82. Id. The court stated that the legislature could make a thorough investigation on
the issue, hold hearings, debate the relevant policy considerations, and then draft stat-
utes to adequately meet the public's needs. Id. See also Henry Grady Hotel Co. v.
Sturgis, 70 Ga. App. 379, 28 S.E.2d 329 (1943) (no liability at common law for furnish-
ing money to intoxicated prson for the purpose of purchasing liquor); Ruth v.
Benvenutti, 114 Ill. App. 3d 404, 449 N.E.2d 209 (1983) (dramshop act is the exclusive
remedy against vendors; no common law cause of action exists based on tavern keeper's
willful misconduct); Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 488 Pa. 513, 523, 412
A.2d 1094, 1099 (1980) (social policies are to be addressed by the legislature, not the
courts).
83. See, e.g., Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl, 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1978) (vendor liability exists for willful misconduct in serving alcohol to in-
toxicated young adult).
84. Id.
85. The court defined willful misconduct as the "intentional doing of something...
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served alcohol to a patron whom he knew recently turned twenty-
one.8 6 The court held defendant vendor liable for willful misconduct
because he was aware of the patron's lack of drinking experience, knew
of the customer's continued drinking, and disregarded tavern owners'
practices.87
Courts have become more willing under the developing common law
to impose liability on liquor licensees for negligent conduct,88 establish-
ing a duty of liquor licensees to take reasonable precautions to prevent
intoxicated customers from injuring third parties.89 Waynick v. Chi-
cago's Last Department Store9° was the first case to dispense with the
dramshop approach and find liability using common law negligence
principles. 91 In Waynick, defendants, an Illinois tavern owner and a
liquor retailer, sold and furnished liquor to intoxicated patrons who
then killed plaintiff's decedent in an automobile collision.92 The Sev-
enth Circuit found the defendants liable for plaintiff's injuries93 under
a negligence cause of action.94 The court focused on the concept of
with knowledge, express or implied, that serious injury is a probable ... result, or the
intentional doing of an act with a wanton and reckless disregard of its consequences."
Id. at 402, 572 P.2d at 1161, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 20 (quoting Williams v. Carr, 68 Cal. 2d
579, 584, 440 P.2d 505, 509, 68 Cal. Rptr. 305, 309 (1968)).
86. Id. at 397, 572 P.2d at 1157, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
87. Id. at 403-04, 572 P.2d at 1162-63, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21.
88. Note, supra note 18, at 813. For a discussion of the state of Washington's con-
sideration of vendor liability under the common law, see Comment, Recognizing the
Liability of Social Hosts Who Knowingly Allow Intoxicated Guests to Drive: Limits to
Socially Acceptable Behavior, 60 WASH. L. REV. 389 (1985).
89. Note, supra note 18, at 813. The duty arises because of the special relationship
between the tavern owner and patron. Id. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying
text (discusses origin of vendor duty).
90. 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959). For a discussion of Waynick, see Note, An Exam-
ination of the Duty Concept: Has It Evolved In Otis Engineering v. Clark?, 36 BAYLOR
L. RaV. 375, 411 (1984).
91. Note, supra note 90, at 411.
92. 269 F.2d 322, 323, 324 (7th Cir. 1959) (Illinois dramshop act did not apply
because the injury occurred in Michigan; consequently, the court examined the case
under common law negligence principles, recognizing that if no common law cause of
action existed, the plaintiff would be without a remedy).
93. Id. at 326. The Seventh Circuit found that every person has a general duty to
use ordinary care to avoid injury to others by any agency set in operation by him. Id. at
325. The court found that defendants breached their duty by selling liquor to two
drunken men. Id.
94. The elements of negligence are: duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and
injury. W. KEETON, supra note 19, at 158-59.
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proximate cause,95 which traditionally had been defined in this context
as the consumption of alcohol. Expanding the meaning of this element
of negligence, the court concluded that the serving or selling of alcohol
could also constitute proximate cause.96 Making vendors liable under
these principles was justified, the court reasoned, in order to protect the
public from injuries incurred as a result of a vendor's sale of liquor to
an intoxicated person.97
After the Seventh Circuit's decision in Waynick, the New Jersey
Supreme Corut also examined a vendor's liability for injuries following
the service of alcohol. 98 In Rappaport v. Nichols9 9 four different tavern
owners served alcohol to an intoxicated minor."° The minor later
caused an automobile accident that killed plaintiff's decedent.'° 1 The
court found that in serving alcohol to an intoxicated minor, the vendor
had violated the State Beverage Control Act. 10 The court held further
that the vendor's actions presented a clear and foreseeable risk to the
traveling public, 03 warranting the imposition of liability under com-
mon law negligence principles."° To determine which party should
properly bear the duty of care under a negligence theory, the Rap-
paport court used a balancing test.10 5 Upon weighing the risk of serv-
ing an intoxicated minor, the relationship between the minor and the
vendor, and the public interest in imposing vendor liability,'0 6 the
court imposed a duty on the tavern owner to protect the public
safety. 0 7 The creation of this duty, similar to the result reached in the
95. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
96. 269 F.2d at 326.
97. Id.
98. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 192, 156 A.2d at 3. An adult paid for Nichols' drinks, but according to
the plaintiffs, the defendants were aware of Nichol's age and intoxication. Id.
101. Id.
102. The New Jersey Beverage Control Act states: "No licensee shall permit any
minor to be served or consume any beverages." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-77 (West 1958)(the same regulation contains aprovision against service to or consumption by any per-
son actively or apparently intoxicated).
103. 31 N.J. at 201, 156 A.2d at 8.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 292-03, 156 A.2d at 8-9. The court stated that the balancing of conflct-
ing interests and policy considerations is a vital process in molding and applying com-
mon law principles of negligence. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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Seventh Circuit, effectively modifies the traditional common law theory
of proximate cause."' Under this new theory, furnishing alcohol to an
intoxicated minor constitutes the proximate cause of any resulting in-
jury inflicted on a third party.10 9
A majority of jurisdictions do not limit liability to the serving of
alcohol to minors and now extend liability to vendors under common
law negligence principles for serving any intoxicated person.110 In On-
tiveros v. Borak 1 ' the Supreme Court of Arizona abolished the com-
mon law vendor immunity doctrine and held a tavern owner liable for
third party injuries sustained after the owner had served alcohol to an
intoxicated person.112 The court found that a tavern owner owes a
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect all individuals whom tavern
owner's patrons may injure.113 According to the court, the duty arises
because a reasonable man would recognize that serving alcohol to an
108. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (discusses traditional theory of
proximate cause).
109. Rappaport, 31 N.J. at 203-04, 156 A.2d at 9. For further discussion of Rap-
paport and its effect on New Jersey and other jurisdictions, see Note, supra note 90, at
411-12 (Rappaport began the New Jersey trend toward imposing vendor and social host
liability); Note, supra note 18, at 815-23 (explains each element of negligence required
under Rappaport). For a discussion of the evolution of the new proximate cause theory,
see Note, supra note 18, at 823; Comment, supra note 32, at 173. (in jurisdictions recog-
nizing a common law tort action against the supplier, furnishing alcohol is considered
the proximate cause of an injury).
110. Comment, supra note 88, at 390 (discusses the present state of the law regard-
ing common law liability of commercial vendors). For examples of courts imposing
liability under common law negligence principles, see Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671
(Alaska 1981) (bartender owes a duty to act with reasonable care when dispensing alco-
hol); Ono v. Appelgate, 612 P.2d 533 (Haw. 1980) (absent a dramshop act, an injured
plaintiff can recover from a tavern owner who served alcohol to an intoxicated person);
Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964) (tavern
owner's service of alcohol to an intoxicated patron was the proximate cause of pedes-
trian plaintiff's injuries).
Fourteen jurisdictions still adhere to the common law rule of non-liability. See, e.g.,
DeLoach v. Mayer Elec. Supply Co., 378 So. 2d 733 (Alaska 1979) (absent a sale, no
liability exists under Alaska's dram shop act); Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d
656 (1965) (no tavern owner liability for serving liquor to intoxicated minor adult).
111. 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (1983) (en banc).
112. Id. at 513, 667 P.2d at 213. The tavern owner sold 30 beers to the patron
throughout the afternoon and evening. Id. at 503, 667 P.2d at 203. The patron left the
bar and was involved in a car accident, injuring the plaintiff. Id. The police officer gave
the patron a breathalyzer test, which had a reading of 0.33%, considerably greater than
the reading required for legal intoxication. Id.
113. Id. at 511, 667 P.2d at 211.
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intoxicated person creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others. 114
Ontiveros typifies the law in most jurisdictions-a vendor is liable for
serving alcohol to a visibly intoxicated customer who later drives while
intoxicated and injures a third party.' 15
2. Extending Liability to Social Hosts under Common Law
Negligence Principles
Until recently, courts consistently refused to hold social hosts liable
under common law negligence principles." 6 In Chastain v. Litton Sys-
tems "7 the defendant held a Christmas party and gratuitously served
alcohol to its employees." 8 One employee became intoxicated; later he
drove a vehicle and collided with another car, fatally injuring a wo-
man. " 9 The Fourth Circuit held that it would not impose liability be-
cause the defendant was a social host.' 21 The majority relied on North
Carolina common law, which precludes social host liability.'
2 1
Other courts, however, apply common law negligence principles to
impose liability on social hosts.' 22 Some of these courts hold that be-
114. Id. at 508, 667 P.2d at 208.
115. Note, Social Host Liability for Injuries Caused by the Acts of an Intoxicated
Guest, 59 N.D.L. REV. 445, 471 (1983) (discusses vendor liabilty arising out of common
law negligence principles).
116. See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Systems, Inc., 694 F.2d 957 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1106 (1982); Klein v. Raysinger, 504 Pa. 141, 470 A.2d 507 (1983).
117. 694 F.2d 957 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1106 (1982).
118. Id. at 959.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 960. The court stated that if Litton was not a social host, the North
Carolina law of torts should determine liability. Id.
121. Id. See also Klein v. Raysinger, 504 Pa. 141, 470 A.2d 507 (1983) (social host
who serves alcoholic beverages to adult guests is not liable under common law negli-
gence principles for injuries and damages sustained as a result of a subsequent car colli-
sion involving the intoxicated guest). For a discussion of social host immunity under
Raysinger, see Note, supra note 7, at 1121.
122. See Coulter v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d
669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978) (court imposed liability on social host apartment man-
ager who served liquor to an intoxicated guest who then was involved in a one car
accident, in which the plaintiff passenger was njured); infra notes 133-45 and accompa-
nying text (discusses Coulter); see also Kelly v. Gwinnel, 190 N.J. Super. 320, 463 A.2d
387 (1983) (social host liable for serving friend alcohol; friend drove home and caused a
car accident, injuring plaintiff), rev'd, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984); infra notes
146-64 and accompanying text (discusses Kelly); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Al-
pha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971) (fraternity liable as social
host for allowing members to serve an intoxicated minor who injured the plaintiff while
driving home); infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text (discusses Wiener). But see
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cause the dramshop statutes provide for but do not fully implement
common law liability, the law in this area is a proper subject for judi-
cial reform. 2 ' Consequently, these courts attempt to effectuate these
principles by extending common law negligence to cover social
hosts.124 They have had limited lasting success, however, in eroding
the traditional common law rule. 125
The first case to hold a social host liable under ordinary negligence
principles was Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega
Fraternity. 26 In Wiener college fraternity members served beer to an
intoxicated minor. 127 While driving home, the minor injured the plain-
tiff.12' The court recognized a cause of action against the fraternity
under ordinary negligence principles, 129 holding that the fraternity had
a duty to not serve alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest.1 30 Recogniz-
ing the novelty and possible future impact of its decision, the court
stated that social host liabilty should be determined on a case-by-case
basis. 3 ' For this reason, the court expressly limited its holding to so-
cial hosts who serve alcohol to an obviously intoxicated minor.13 2
The California Supreme Court took a similar position in Coulter v.
Superior Court of San Mateo County.'13 In Coulter an apartment
Kowal v. Hofher, 181 Conn. 355, 436 A.2d 1 (1980) (no common law liability for social
hosts).
123, See, e.g., Buchanan v. Merger Enterprise, Inc., 463 So. 2d 121, 127 (Ala.
1985).
124. Id. The Buchanan court held the vendor liable under common law negligence
principles for serving alcohol to an intoxicated patron who drove an automobile and
killed plaintiff's decedent. Id. at 124.
125. The California legislature, in response to Coulter, enacted a statute that abro-
gated Coulter's social host liability. See infra note 143. The New Jersey legislature also
introduced a bill that precludes social host liability by abrogating Kelly. See infra note
187.
126. 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971). In Wiener the defendant fraternity held a
party for members of the fraternity and their guests. Id. at 636, 485 P.2d at 20.
127. Id. at 637, 485 P.2d at 20.
128. Id.
129. The issue before the court was whether a cause of action existed against the
fraternity for negligently serving liquor to an intoxicated minor. Id. at 643, 485 P.2d at
23.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 639, 485 P.2d at 21. In 1979, the Oregon legislature enacted a statute
permitting a plaintiff to sue a private host who serves alcohol to a visibly intoxicated
guest. ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.995 (1984).
132. 258 Or. 643, 485 P.2d at 23.
133. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
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owner and manager served alcohol to a group of tenants in the apart-
ment complex.13 4 One guest became intoxicated and later, while driv-
ing under the influence, injured a passenger. 135 The passenger sued
under both statutory and common law negligence principles.136 The
court interpreted the California statute that prohibits the sale or fur-
nishing of alcohol to an intoxicated person to include social hosts.137
Under this statutory provision the court found the social host liable for
serving alcohol to the intoxicated guest.
138
The Coulter court also analyzed the case under common law negli-
gence principles' 39 and articulated a fundamental California common
law principle: a person owes a duty of reasonable care to another if a
risk of harm is foreseeable."40 The court found that defendants, know-
ing that the guest intended to drive, could reasonably foresee a third
party injury resulting from serving alcohol to the intoxicated guest.14
The defendants breached their duty by continuing to serve alcohol to
the obviously intoxicated guest. 142 The court held that social hosts and
other noncommercial alcohol providers are liable under common law
negligence principles if they serve alcohol to obviously intoxicated
guests who pose a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to third per-
sons.' 4 3 The court balanced the strong public policy against drunk
driving with the burden imposed on noncommercial suppliers,'" find-
ing in favor of social host liability because intoxicated drivers seriously
threaten the lives of the public.145
134. Id. at 148, 577 P.2d at 671, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 151, 577 P.2d at 672, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
137. Id. The relevant section of the California Business and Professions Code reads:
"Every person who sells, furnishes, gives or causes to be sold, furnished or given away,
any alcoholic beverage to ... any obviously intoxicated person is guilty of a misde-
meanor." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West Supp. 1985). The court found that
"every person" applies to both commercial and non-commercial suppliers of alcoholic
beverages. 21 Cal. 3d at 151, 577 P.2d at 672, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
138. Id. at 153, 577 P.2d at 673, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 153, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
141. Id. The court found that a reasonably receptive host could foresee the danger
of ultimate harm as well as a bartender.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 155, 577 P.2d at 675, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
145. Id. The California legislature subsequently abrogated Coulter when it enacted
a statute that precludes social host liability through a mandate that the proximate cause
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Kelly v. Gwinnel146 provides the most complete discussion of social
host liability. In Kelly the Supreme Court of New Jersey followed the
Coulter rationale and recognized a cause of action against a social
host. 47 The defendant in Kelly invited a friend to his home and served
a few drinks.' 48 Shortly after finishing the drinks, the friend left the
defendant's home and caused a head-on collision, injuring the plain-
tiff.' 49 The court held that a social host who serves alcohol to an adult
guest is liable under common law negligence for injuries to third per-
sons caused by the guest's drunk driving, if the host knew the guest
would soon be driving while intoxicated."5 °
The court first considered whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a
duty of reasonable care. 15 ' The court applied the Rappaport balancing
test 52 and found that imposing a duty on social hosts is fair and con-
sistent with policy. 15 3 Because the defendant had failed to reasonably
oversee the serving of liquor to his guest, the court further held that the
of a third party's injuries sustained from the acts of an intoxicated person is the con-
sumption, rather than the furnishing, of alcohol. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(b) (West
Supp, 1985).
New Jersey took a similar approach in Figuly v. Knoll, 185 N.J. Super. 477, 449 A.2d
564 (1982). In Figuly the court recognized a cause of action against a social host under
common law negligence principles. Id. at 478, 449 A.2d at 565. The defendant held a
party on rented premises where he resided. Id. at 479, 449 A.2d at 564. One guest was
served 12 mixed drinks over a five hour period and became visibly intoxicated. Id. The
guest left the party and was involved in a car accident, injuring the plaintiff. Id. at 478,
449 A.2d at 564. The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment and
held that a social host who furnishes alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person under
circumstances that create a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to others may be held
legally responsible to third persons who are injured. Id.
146. 196 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
147. Id. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222.
148. Id. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1220. After the accident, the friend was given a blood
test that indicated a blood alcohol concentration of 0.286%. Id. A person who drives
with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more violates N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-5
(West 1983). At trial, plaintiff's expert testified that the blood test revealed that the
friend had consumed the equivalent of 13 drinks. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224-25.
151. Id. at 546, 476 A.2d at 1222.
152. See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
153. 196 N.J. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222. In balancing the various factors on the
issue of liability, the court considered the thousands of deaths drunk drivers cause each
year, the fact that liquor licensees are prohibited from serving intoxicated adults, and
the legislative imposition of criminal sanctions against drunk drivers. Id.
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defendant breached his duty.15 4 The court abandoned the traditional
proximate cause rule'55 and found that serving alcohol was the proxi-
mate cause of the plaintiff's injury. 5 6 The court based its decision on
two rationales. First, people injured as a result of drunk driving should
be fairly compensated.157 Second, imposing social host liability deters
drunk driving. 58 In the court's opinion, social host liability will en-
courage hosts to take greater care when serving alcohol at social
gatherings.15 9
Judge Gibraldi's dissent strongly disagreed with the majority's ra-
tionale.' 6° Gibraldi focused on the importance of judicial deference to
the legislature,16 1 stating that the legislature is better equipped to effec-
tuate the goals of reducing drunk driving and protecting the interests
of injured parties without placing such a grave burden on the average
citizen.' 62 The dissent also criticized the majority for ignoring the dif-
ferences between vendors and social hosts. 163 Gibraldi asserted that
the majority failed to recognize the average citizen's ignorance in deter-
mining whether a guest is intoxicated and hosts' inability to spread
154. Id. See also Special Project, supra note 4, at 1109-10 (host may serve guest up
to the point of intoxication without breaching his duty to reasonably oversee the service
of liquor to his guest).
155. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
156. 196 N.J. 544, 476 A.2d at 1221-22.
157. Id. at 551, 476 A.2d at 1226. For a critical discussion of the Kelly court's
rationale, see Note, supra note 1, at 616; see also Comment, supra note 70, at 98 (dis-
cusses the impact Kelly could have on the majority rule of social host immunity).
158. 196 N.J. at 551, 476 A.2d at 1226.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 560, 476 A.2d at 1230.
161. Id. Gibraldi argued that the majority's decision was based on little knowledge
or concern for the possible negative consequences of its decision. Id. at 565, 476 A.2d at
1232.
162. Id. at 569, 476 A.2d at 1234. Gibraldi listed four possible solutions the legisla-
ture may consider:
(1) Funding a remedy for injured parties with contributions from parties most re-
sponsible for the harm caused, the intoxicated motorist;
(2) Hold the Social host secondarily liable by requiring judgment against the
drunk driver as a prerequisite to suit against the host;
(3) Limiting the amount that could be recovered from a social host; and
(4) Requiring a finding of wanton and reckless conduct before holding a social
host liable.
196 N.J. at 569-70, 476 A.2d at 1235. See Special Project, supra note 4, at 1113 (dis-
cusses Kelly dissent).
163. Id. at 564, 476 A.2d at 1232.
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liability costs among their guests.' 64
3. Analysis
Legislatures and courts are attacking the concept of social host lia-
bility under common law negligence principles.1 65 Traditional causa-
tion theory166 must be expanded to accommodate social host liability.
To hold a social host liable requires finding that, but for the social
host's furnishing liquor to an intoxicated person, the third party would
not have been injured. A fundamental flaw exists in this theory. 167
The guest's consumption is voluntary.168 The individual will become
intoxicated regardless of how or from whom he obtains the liquor. The
social host merely provides alcohol that the drunken individual would
obtain elsewhere. Despite the social hosts's act of furnishing liquor,
the "consumer" would still create the same risk of injury to the third
party. The social hosts' act is, therefore, not the "actual" cause of the
injury.
Additionally, furnishing liquor is not the proximate cause of the re-
sulting injury. A drunk guest's voluntary decision to consume liquor
to the point of intoxication and thereafter drive an automobile are in-
tervening acts. These acts supercede a social host's offering of liquor
because the social host cannot reasonably foresee that the guest will
become intoxicated, drive his car, and injure a third party. Thus, the
social host's act cannot fairly be considered the legal cause of the in-jury. The guest who voluntarily becomes intoxicated and assumes the
risk of driving a car is the negligent if not reckless party. Full blame
for the injuries belongs on the drunk driver. 169
164. Id. at 565, 476 A.2d at 1233-34.
165. See supra note 125 (California and New Jersey legislatures' negative response
to social host liability). For examples of courts' refusal to impose social host liability,
see Kowal v. Hofher, 181 Conn. 355, 436 A.2d 1 (1980); Miller v. Moran, 96 II. App.
3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046 (1981); Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836
(Minn. 1982).
166. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 99-109 and
accompanying text (discusses the shift in theories).
167. See supra notes 92-109, 155-59 and accompanying texts (discuss the theory of
proximate cause under social host liability).
168. A voluntary act is unimpelled by another's influence; such acts are the result of
free choice. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1413 (5th ed. 1979).
169. For further criticism of social host liability under common law negligence
principles, see Note, supra note 1, at 634 (social host liability is too burdensome for the
average citizen).
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One goal of the tort system is to properly attribute fault for drunk
driving accidents."' 0 This goal is not achieved unless the party at fault,
the drunk driver, is held fully accountable. Social host liability im-
pedes efforts to reach this goal because it allows drunk drivers to share
liability with social hosts. Drunkenness does not relieve automobile
drivers of their duty of ordinary care.17 1 Yet, stretching negligence law
to hold social hosts liable achieves this exact effect.
The tort system is also designed to deter negligent and intentional
misconduct.172 Making social hosts liable will not advance this objec-
tive. Rather, social host liability will only encourage drunk driving
because guests know they can pass off their liability to the host who
served the liquor.
Perhaps the most significant problem with social host liability under
common law negligence theory is the requirement that a social host
must have actual knowledge that the guest is intoxicated. 7 This re-
quirement was set forth in Kelly v. Gwinnel.'7 4 The Kelly court as-
sumed, however, that the host had knowledge because of the guest's
blood alcohol test results.175 The court made this assumption despite
the fact that no correlation exists between blood alcohol test results
and a host's subjective knowledge.1 76 Though objective tests attempt
to measure a guest's intoxication level after an accident, they do not
prove that the guest was visibly drunk. 177 Because of the dubious ac-
170. Comment, supra note 19, at 870.
171. W. KEETON, supra note 17, at 178. Courts uniformly hold that voluntary or
negligent intoxication cannot serve as an excuse for acts that would otherwise be negli-
gent. Id. One who becomes intoxicated is held thereafter to the same standard as if he
were a sober person.
172. Id.
173. 196 N.J. 549, 476 A.2d at 1225.
174. Id. For a discussion of the Kelly rule, see Special Project, supra note 4, at 1105-
09.
175. See Kelly, 196 N.J. 565, 476 A.2d at 1233.
176. Objective blood alcohol tests do not necessarily prove that the guest appeared
to the host to be intoxicated. Note, supra note 1, at 634 (critical discussion of Kelly).
Experts estimate that alcohol takes 20-30 minutes to reach its highest level in the blood
stream. Kelly, 196 N.J. at 565-66, 476 A.2d at 1233. Thus, a blood alcohol concentra-
tion test showing intoxication after an accident may not mean that the guest was visibly
intoxicated when he left the party. Id.
177. 196 N.J. at 566, 476 A.2d at 1233 (dissenting opinion, citing Perr, Blood Alco-
hol Levels and Diminished Capacity, 33 J. LEGAL MED. 28, 28-30 (April 1975)). Fur-
thermore, studies indicate that blood alcohol tests do not accurately determine
intoxication levels and should not be relied on for that purpose. Id.
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curacy of blood alcohol tests and in light of the difficulty an untrained
person has in determining whether another is intoxicated, social host
liability places an unreasonable burden on a social host.
III. IMPACT AND RECOMMENDATION
One impact social host liability will have is to increase insurance
costs, 178 perhaps to prohibitive levels. If homeowner's insurance does
not cover social host liability, social hosts will be forced to obtain addi-
tional insurance to protect themselves in case of liability. 179 Poten-
tially aggravating this problem is the possibility that added coverage
may be too expensive or perhaps even unavailable. 80 Without the nec-
essary insurance coverage and assuming that the social host cannot
personally satisfy the liability judgment award, 8 ' drunk driving acci-
dent victims may not be adequately compensated.182 Additionally, if
insurance coverage is unavailable, social hosts may be forced to com-
pletely curtail their service of alcohol to avoid the risk of losing their
assets.183 Even if social hosts can obtain adequate liability insurance
coverage, the cost of insurance will rise due to the increased risks this
liability coverage poses for insurance companies. Insurance companies
will pass the increased costs on to the public in the form of higher
insurance premiums. The ultimate loser is the consumer who must pay
the increased rates.
Social host liability creates uncertainty among hosts and guests.
Neither the courts nor the legislatures have clearly outlined the specific
behavior that gives rise to social host liability.184 Two state legislatures
responded to this uncertainty by directly addressing social host liability
178. See Kelly, 196 N.J. 564-65, 476 A.2d at 1232-33 (dissenting opinion attacked
majority for ignoring the increased costs of social host liability insurance). See also
Special Project, supra note 4, at 1113 (discusses insurance problems).
179. Special Project, supra note 4, at 1113.
180. Id.
181. Comment, supra note 19, at 870.
182, Special Project, supra note 4, at 1113. See also Kelly, 196 N.J. at 560, 476 A.2d
at 1230 (dissenting opinion).
183. Comment, supra note 70, at 108.
184. Kelly, 196 N.J. at 567, 476 A.2d at 1234. One problem with this uncertainty is
that affirmative defenses may not be available to the social host. First, a social host may
assert the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk, for example,
only if the plaintiff is the drunk driver. Contributory negligence is asserted when the
plaintiff's conduct entitles him to bring an action. See W. KEETON, supra note 17, at
451. Contributory negligence is inappropriate if the plaintiff is not the drunk driver
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under common law negligence principles. For example, the California
legislature, responding to Coulter,185 enacted a statute that precludes
social host liability." 6 Similarly, the New Jersey legislature, respond-
ing to Kelly, introduced a bill expressly exempting social hosts from
liability for serving alcohol to intoxicated guests. 8 7 Aside from Cali-
fornia and New Jersey, however, only vague statutes and ambiguous
court opinions address social host liability principles under common
law negligence. 88 Consequently, social hosts have no clear means of
regulating their behavior to avoid liability. This may lead to a drastic
decrease in social gatherings until the legislatures or courts clearly de-
fine what is required of social hosts.
Society is justifiably concerned with the drunk driving problem.1 89
Social host liability, however, is not the solution. Courts and legisla-
tures must attack the source of the problem-people who voluntarily
consume excessive amounts of alcohol. 9 One obvious solution is
more strict drunk driving laws.91 Social host liability provides drunk
because the drunk driver, not the victim, is negligent under common law negligence
principles.
Second, a defendant asserts the defense of assumption of the risk to bar a plaintiff's
recovery. W. KEETON, supra note 17, at 487. He must show that the plaintiff knew the
risk was present, understood its nature, and freely and voluntarily chose to participate.
Id. As with contributory negligence, the difficulty with invoking assumption of the risk
is that the injured plaintiff is not the negligent party. Courts differ as to whether as-
sumption of the risk defense is available to the defendant. See, e.g., Passini v. Decker,
39 Conn. Supp. 20, 467 A.2d 442 (1983) (no assumption of the risk for defendant under
dramshop act when tavern owner served liquor to an intoxicated patron who injured
plaintiff in car accident). But cf. Berge v. Harris, 170 N.W.2d 621 (Iowa 1983) (defend-
ant permitted to assert assumption of the risk because the plaintiff passenger knew the
driver was intoxicated). For a discussion of potential affirmative defenses available to
social hosts, see Note, supra note 16, at 1165 (addressed the difficulty a social host
encounters when attempting to use affirmative defenses).
185. See supra notes 133-45 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 143 (California's new statute precluding social host liability).
187. The New Jersey bill reads:
No person, other than a person licensed ... to sell alcoholic beverages, who fur-
nishes any alcoholic beverages to any person at or over the age at which a person is
authorized to purchase and consume alcoholic beverages shall be civilly liable to
any person or estate of any person for personal injuries or property damage, in-
flicted as a result of intoxication by the consumer of the alcoholic beverage.
A. 43, 201st Leg., 1st Sess., 1984 New Jersey Laws.
188. Note, supra note 1, at 634.
189. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
190. Note, supra note 1, at 634.
191. Id. at 637.
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drivers with another means of avoiding full liability. Thus, no incen-
tive to avoid driving while intoxicated exists. More strict drunk driv-
ing laws, such as a mandatory twenty-four hour jail sentence plus a one
year driver's license suspension for the first offense, are more likely to
deter such conduct.
IV. CONCLUSION
Vendor liability based on state dramshop legislation is justified be-
cause of the relationship between the vendor and customer, the ven-
dor's ability to spread liability costs among customers, and vendor
expertise in recognizing intoxicated persons.192 Similar reasons for cre-
ating a cause of action against social hosts do not exist. Social hosts
should, therefore, not be held liable under dramshop statutes or com-
mon law negligence principles.193 Legislative intent underlying dram-
shop acts and the goals of the tort system favor a social host immunity
rule.194 Strict drunk driving penalties more effectively attack the
source of the drunk driving problem. 195 Increased penalties will better
effectuate the tort system's goal of fairly compensating drunk driving
victims, while also decreasing the number of victims through
deterrence.
Social hosts cannot fairly be held responsible for monitoring the
drinking activities of their guests. Because adults are expected to be
accountable for their own actions, they must assume full responsibility
for the consequences of their intoxication.
Angelina Marie Massari *
192. See supra notes 23-38, 52-67 and accompanying texts.
193. Kelly, 196 N.J. at 568, 476 A.2d at 1234.
194. See supra notes 39-49, 171-72 and accompanying texts.
195. See, e.g., Comment, Ohio Enacts Stringent Penalties to Deter Drunk Driving, 9
U. DAYTON L. REv. 147 (1983) (Ohio's enactment of stricter drunk driving laws to
solve the drunk driving problem).
* J.D. 1987, Washington University.
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